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PROPOSING A NEW YORK "CLOSE CORPORATION
LAW"
NORMAN WINER
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the fashioning of an improved
and realistic law for close corporations.
Despite various revisions of our corporate laws since the general acts
opened the floodgates to closely held enterprises, no attempt has been made
to formulate legislation to fit the characteristics which obviously distinguish
the close corporation from the public one. The same law applies to the two
incorporated "partners" who invest $3,000 and to the 400,000 investors who
own readily marketable securities in an. enterprise with total assets of
$2,000,000,000.
From application of these same concepts, the close corporation suffers. Stock-
holders' agreements, in which attempt is made to adjust the structure desired
by the stockholders to the statutory forms, abound in clauses of needless com-
plexity, illegality, and unenforceability.
The courts, driven to vary the general rules, defensively characterize the
close corporation as a "chartered"' or "incorporated" 2 partnership and some-
times adopt such hedges as that of Chief Judge Cullen: "Such corporations
were little more (though not the same as) than chartered partnerships." 3
n. THE TYPE or LAW
The laws for public corporations are devised for investors as well as third
parties. The 'state must protect those who buy into enterprises of which
they can, have no detailed knowledge and must protect those who own such
shares without any control over the use of their funds.
In close corporations, the need to protect the investor is quite different.
He, as does the partner, picks his associates and generally is one of those
in control of his money. On the other hand, he is in a position where he
must trust each fellow-stockholder, something unnecessary and unjustified
in a public corporation.
In large corporations, securities are readily marketable; it is necessary for
the close incorporator to have a way out; yet, it is suggested, that way should
lRipin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N. 'Y. 442, 447, 98 N . E. 855, 856 (1912).
2Cuppy v. Ward, 187 App. Div. 625, 639, 176 N. Y. Supp. 233, 243 (1st Dep't' 1919)
(dissenting opinion of Shearn, J.), aff'd, 227 N. Y. 603, 125 N. E. 915 (1919).3See note 1 supra.
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not be to compel liquidation at the expense of the other stockholders as in a
partnership.
Again, because of the limited assets at risk, the state has the same interest
in protecting those who trade with a close corporation as with a public
corporation, and the same interest in their tort victims. *The assets must
not be distributed or dissipated at the expense of the third parties.
In short, in many respects, the best law for close corporations is similar
to, and in many respects it differs from, each other existing law for associ-
ations of capital and associations of persons. Consequently, it appears most
feasible to frame a separate law.
III. DEFINITION
The usual characteristics of the close corporation are: (1) the stock-
holders are few; (2) they know one another well; (3) most or all of them
are active; (4) each of them assumes some affirmative obligations; (5) there
is no ready market for their shares; and (6) the identity of the other share-
holders is important to each of them.
There are many corporations which lack one or more of the fore-
going, but are, nevertheless, close corporations. From the practical point
of view, it seems best to start with one-man corporations, an institution
which we, as distinguished from many other countries, recognize,4 and to
limit the maximum number of stockholders; normally, with few stockhold-
ers, the corporation will possess most of the above characteristics.
In England 5 and Belgium 6 "private" and limited responsibility companies
come under different statutes if stockholders do not exceed fifty, if the
transfer of shares is restricted and if public subscription is renounced.
These, are not our close corporations; fifty stockholders cannot be intimate;
restriction on transfer is a common attribute but not an inevitable' one;
public subscription is wholly theoretical.
Our comynon situations are: two or three men pool their resources and
ability; one man buys a parcel of realty or his success has been such that
he can remove part of his capital from the business and would like to put
it away safely; one man finances two or three others; a merchandising close
4A.discussion of the extent to which a body of law has developed for one man corpora-
tions may be read in Fuller, The Incorporated Inzdiviual: A Study of the One-Man
Company (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 1373. See England: Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20
GEo. 5, c. 23, § 28; Belgium: Law of July 9, 1935, loi vnodifiant Ia loi sur les sociftis
coopiratives et instituant des socjjt~s de persomws a responsabiliti limitie (MoITrr. 10
Juillet) Art. 1145; France: Law of March 7, 1925. Tendcnt h instituter des sociftis &
respofsabiliti liitite (JOURNAL OFF. Du 7 MARs 1925), Art. 5.5 England: Companies Act. 1929, 19 & 20 GEo. 5, c. 23, § 26.6Belgium: Arts. 114 bis, 1145.
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corporation buys a store site on which it prefers not to assume the mortgage;
a mercantile close corporation wishes to venture into manufacturing;
a real estate close corporation puts its several properties at separate risk
or divides its management operations from its owned parcels, etc.
For the purposes of the present discussion, a close corporation is one with
one to five ultimate stockholders, although undoubtedly close corporations
often have more. Generally, if there are three original incorporators, and
two die, leaving four heirs each, the original intimacy, sometimes even
acquaintaice, is lost, and the heirs rarely participate in the business; such a
corporation ceases to be close in the sense here used. So, too, when a
single corporation with 1,000 stockholders is the sole stockholder in a sub-
sidiary, the latter is not a close corporation. When, on the other hand, five
stockholders, either through a holding corporation or separately, own sev-
eral corporations, each of them is close within the definition here suggested.
IV. CONTROL
In the publicly owned corporation, the possession of control is of ho
moment to those who merely seek a remunerative investment in the shares of
that corporation. In their "own business" it is vital. The freedom afforded
by the Partnership Law to partners to agree among themselves as to who
will control 7 is desirable for close corporations.
The parties frequently desire a complex division of power. The money-
man insists, at least, on veto power with respect to salaries and directive
power with respect to dividends. The merchandiser wants his own styling
and selling methods. The investor-employee wants his job and some voice
in all corporate decisions. Corporate theory places all these matters, in some
or all of their aspects, within the province of the board of directors, and it
recognizes no right in a minority of the board ever to outvote the majority;
nor does it brook the intervention of outsiders to determine corporate policy
whether or not the board is deadlocked. In short, the flexibility desired
is not legally obtainable.
A. Election of Directors
The New York Stock Corporation Law gives latitude in the selection of
the board. The stockholders may assure a fixed number of directors by
forbidding change in number without unanimous consent.8 They may assure
the identity of the directorate by agreeing to vote for one another.9 By
classifying stock, they may assure each stockholder the power to name a
7N. Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW 40. See King v. Sarria, 69 N. Y. 24 (1877).8See note 1 supra.
9See Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918); Clark v. Dodge, 269
N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936).
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given number of directors.10 An aberration prevents provision for election
of directors by any number other than a plurality of those voting." Cumu-
lative voting'2 will usually insure some representation on the board.
Assuming, then, that the draftsman has not overlooked possible traps,
he can, under existing law, assure the stockholders as to the personnel of
the board. One type of pitfall is the opportunity to increase stock. If power
depends upon a percentage of voting shares, the wealthy stockholders may
frequently unbalance a carefully formulated plan by voting a stock increase,13
as to which the poor ones may be unable to exercise their pre-emptive
rights.' 4 Where a small interest holds the balance of power, a poor stock-
holder may be unable to match the extravagant bid of the rich to buy that
stock. These gaps should be closed by forbidding stock increase without
unanimous consent, unless the stockholders have, in advance, affirmatively
'agreed otherwise, and by extending pre-emptive rights to the latter case.
While the latter is obviously not a perfect remedy, since (1) the amount will
not be unlimited, and, as will appear below, (2) an ever-available right to
dissolve is suggested, the combination gives fair assurance against over-
payment for the stock. The possibility of majority agreements to effect
control' 5 should be eliminated.
B. Functions of the Board
The board, however, is generally but a superfluous complication. On the
one hand, five stockholders may well manage their own affairs. On the other,
once they create a board, the stockholders are shackled.16
For example, the board may be well-constituted to prevent the majority
stockholder from dominating it. But where it is intended that he be sole
'ON. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 51.
"'Matter of Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N. Y. Supp. 430(1st Dep't 1921), aff'd, 231 N. Y. 615, 132 N. E. 910 (1921). The 'distinction between
preserving the number of and the identical directors may be a substantial one. The
ground in the opinion, however, that the statute says the number of directors "may" be
increased, but directors "shall" be elected by a plurality, is not convincing, as neither
thought could have been expressed the other way. See N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW§§ 35, 55.
12N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 49.
13Under existing law it is not clear whether the issuance of shares, authorized but
unissued, is for the stockholders or the directors, 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORA-
TIONS (Perm. ed. 1932) pp. 286-287. A newly authorized issue must be voted by half or
two-thirds of the shares, according to circumstances. N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 37.
A typical example of such abuse is found in Witherbee v. Bowles, 201 N. Y. 427, 95
N. E. 27 (1911).
14 N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 39.15See part V, section E, infra.
16 This aspect, it seems, has been in the minds of previous writers, who have not gone
beyond the stage of "there ought to be a law." Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the
Close Corporation (1929) 27 MICH. L. REv. 273; 2 RORRLICHr, LAW AND PRACTICE IN
CORPORATE CONTROL (1933) 215.
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determiner of dividend policies, but not of other action, the board generally
cannot be adapted to both purposes.
A brief review of the authorities on this subject may prove helpful.
Frequently, it is of great consequence to one stockholder that he maintain
his prestige in his field by being president of the new corporation he joins.
How can he assure himself of that position in view of Section 60 of the Stock
Corporation Law, which provides that the directors, at their pleasure, may
remove any officer or employee ?17 Unless he controls the board, the Appel-
late Division, First Department, has taken the view that there is no way.
In 1901, in Flaherty v. Cary,'8 at least two justices, in concurring opinions,
believed such an impingement upon the board's powers was against public
policy. In 1919, the court so held, three to two, where the parties to the
agreement were the only two stockholders ;19 the majority intimated that such
an agreement at the inception of the corporation might have been valid, but
that an existing corporation could not later be converted into an "incorpor-
ated partnership." The distinction is not reassuring, particularly since, in
1934, the same court held invalid such an agreement made apparently at
the inception of the corporation.20
Since those decisions, however, the Court of Appeals has gone at least
so far as to hold that an agreement to keep in office is not ipso facto un-
enforceable. In Clark v. Dodge,2 1 the court, after stating that such an agree-
ment would not be enforced in the face of infidelity by the officer,22 upheld
an agreement to continue Clark in office as long as "faithful, efficient and com-
petent" for that "could harm nobody" and "the invasion of the powers of
the directorate," if any, "is so slight as to be negligible; and certainly there
is no damage suffered by or threatened to anybody."2'
In what position does this leave counsel to advise "Clark" and "Dodge"
17The removed officer can doubtless recover his damages for breach of the contract.
In re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
1862 App. Div. 116, 70 N. Y. Supp. 951 (1st Dep't 1901), aff'd, 174 N. Y. 550, 67
N. E. 1082 (1903).
19Cuppy v. Ward, 187 App. Div. 625, 176 N. Y. Supp. 233 (1st Dep't 1919), aff'd, 227
N. Y. 603, 125 N. E. 915 (1919). No inferences may be drawn from the memorandum
affirmance of the Court of Appeals in view of the question presented as to the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation.20Matter of Allied Fruit & Extract Co., Inc., 243 App. Div. 52, 276 N. Y. Supp. 153
(1st Dep't 1934), motion for leave to appeal denied, 266 N. Y. I v (1934).
21269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936).22Fells v. Katz, 256 N. Y. 67, 175 N. E. 516 (1931).
2There were other terms in the agreement, including an agreement that one stockholder
would vote for the other as director, that plaintiff, owning twenty-five per cent of the
stock, should receive twenty-five per cent of the "net income" (construed as net earn-
ings after reserves, by the court), and that no unreasonable salaries would be paid.
,These, of course, are no invasion of directors' powers.
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at the time-they make the agreement or at the time that "Dodge" concludes
"Clark" must go? Suppose "Clark" is faithful, but "Dodge" concludes
either (1) that he had originally misjudged "Clark" and that "Clark" was
neither efficient nor competent or (2) that "Clark" had originally been
faithful, efficient, and competent but because of age, illness, or other causes
retained only the virtue of faithfulness. Does the agreement become invalid
because "Dodge" so concludes, or onliy when he proves to the court that
he so concludes, or when he proves to the court that a reasonable man would
so conclude? Because of the intimacy of the relationship and the importance
of the business to the stockholders, it is frequently hard on "Dodge" to force
him to continue "Clark" in office if "Dodge" honestly believes "Clark" in-
efficient, regardless of the ultimate fact of the matter.
Germany,24 Belgium,2 5 and France26 hold such agreements binding except
for "wichtige Griinde" or "motifs graves" meaning gross neglect, dishonesty,
incapacity.
That appears the preferable pattern. Where "Clark" is a stockholder we
have the example par excellence of an agency coupled with an interest. A
party found dishonest or incapacitated could not enforce the agreement. Any
other could, subject only to the right to dissolution. The indestructible right
to dissolve is discussed below; but as long as the corporation continues, the
officer's contract should be specifically enforceable. Impingement upon the
functions of the board is merely a verbal rationalization. No public interest
is affected; the only ones involved are the parties to a good or poor bargain,
and "Clark" 'may have sacrificed much and have invested all he had in an
effort to build a business for himself and "Dodge."
Secondly, it is frequently essential to the formation of a successful cor-
poration that one or more stockholders be given dominion over dividends.
In 1881, the Court of Appeals held in Lorillard v. Clyde2 7 that an agreement
to pay a dividend of seven per cent was not illegal; but it added the dictum
that it might be unenforceable.28 The Appellate Division, First Department,
said in 1914 that an agreement among five sole stockholders that "profit
shall be distributed in a certain way, irrespective of the stock held by
24Gesetz betr. die Gesellschaften mit beschriidnkter Haftung, vorn 20 April, 1892, § 38.
In later modifications of this statute, section numbers have been changed, and allowance
must be made for numbering of these sections.25 Belgium: Art. 11415.26France: Art. 24.
2786 N. Y. 384 (1881).
28Andrews, J., wrote [id. at 389]: "An agreement providing for the details of manage-
ment made in advance, might not be binding upon the tr.ustees ,of the corporation when
organized, but such agreement is not illegal."
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them, would be void. as against public policy." 29 In 1919, two justices
of the same court thought that such an agreement between two who were
the only stockholders was valid.8 0 The Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, in compelling payment of dividends withheld apparently in bad faith,
said that if creditors were unaffected "there is no reason why the exercise of
the power and discretion of the directors cannot be ontrolled by valid agree-
ment between themselves [the stockholders]."'31 In the following year, that
court refused to enforce such an agreement; while deciding on other grounds,
it stated its doubts as to the enforceability of the stockholders' agreement,
as against the directors, barring extreme circumstances.32 To put it mildly,
it is somewhat difficult for counsel to advise on the validity of such an
agreement.
Thirdly, there are the common provisions in case of deadlock. Frequently, as
a prerequisite to the formation of a corporation, the board must be so divided
as virtually to promise an impasse in case of crisis. Arbitration, should the
directors divide equally, is a feasible solution, if legal. Today, however, it
is not legal or enforceable because: (1) the arbitration statute does not
include an award to determine policy3 and (2) corporate theory prevents
abdication by the board. 4 Again, in a recent case, where several parcels of
realty were owned by a close corporation, internecine antagonism, abetted by
provisions perfectly adapted for a deadlock, paralyzed the corporation. Par-
tition, sale, dissolution, with real estate prices depressed, were impractical;
continued operation was essential. Complete control was, therefore, en-
trusted to a stranger. Was that legal?
C. Lack of Realism in Theory of Board Control
The fundamental error is the notion that since a board acting for 400,000
stockholders should always be free to exercise uncontrolled judgment, the
same applies in a close corporation.
2 9 Abbott v. Harbeson Textile Co., 162 App. Div. 405, 410, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1031, 1035
(1st Dep't 1914).
SOCuppy v. Ward, 187 App. Div. 625, 641, 176 N. Y. Supp. 233, 239 (1st' Dep't 1919)
(dissenting opinion), aff'd, 227 N. Y. 603, 125 N. E. 915 (1919).3 1Kassell v. Empire Tinware Co. et al., 178 App. Div. 176, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (2d
Dep't 1917).3 2The case, Dejonge v. Zentgraf, 182 App. Div. 43, 169 N. Y. Supp. 377 (2d Dep't
1918), was decided on the ground that the contract did not explicitly require payment of
the dividends, and the remarks summarized here in the text are dicta.3 3N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448 makes arbitrable such controversies as "may be the subject
of an action." For reasons already noted, these agreements do not seem to be such.
Matter of Stern, 285 N. Y. 239, 33 N. E. (2d) 689 (1941) ; Benedict v. Limited Edi-
tions Club, Inc., - App. Div. -, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 852 (1st Dep't 1943).3 41n Matter of Allied Fruit & Extract Co., Inc., 243 App. Div. 52, 276 N. Y. Supp.
153 (1st Dep't 1934), motion for leave to appeal denied, 266 N. Y. fv (1934), such
an agreement was held unenforceable.
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Eliminating the board makes the error clearer. Frequently, it is convenient
to have a board, to leave certain stockholders without a voice in manage-
ment. But, if we were to eliminate the board, we could readily perceive
that the stockholders, as "partners," might bind themselves to give one or
another permanent control of one aspect or another of the corporation's
affairs. The same should apply to a close corporation whether or not it has
a board.
Various continental laws, specially devised for smaller corporations,8 5 make
the board optional. In Belgium, the "cominissaires de surveillance" need not
be elected by corporations with five or fewer stockholders ;36 in France, the
"'conseil de surveillance" may be dispensed with in corporations with twenty
or fewer stockholders ;BT in Germany, an Aufsichtsrath is never necessary ;38
in England, directors need not be elected by a private company, which may
have up to fifty stockholders. 0
D. Stockholders' Voting Rights
There remains, despite the proposed freedom in agreement, justification
for the corporate rather than the partnership form. In legal theory, as well
as in factual relations, the emphasis in corporations is upon the share of the net
worth owned by each stockholder in determining his proportionate voting
rights; in partnerships, the emphasis is upon the individuals, despite differences
in shares of the proprietorship. In continental laws, the hybrid nature of the
close corporation is frequently given expression by providing that a-vote-a-
share is the primary method for making decisions, but that in some instances,
usually capital increase or other structural change, the vote must carry by a
preponderance of stockholders as well as of shares. 40
The virtue of this method is in increasing minority veto power so as to pre-
vent those who hold a preponderant financial interest from riding roughshod
over an aggregate membership, which, by its nature, is a cross between a
personal association and an association of capital. As such, it is a method
of preserving minority strength, but not an aid in determining corporate
policy or action.
The basic difference between the personal and the share vote, however, is
85At least Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, England, France Germany, Luxembourg, and
Poland have such laws.36Belgium: Art. 11420.87France: Art. 32.38Germany: § 52.
39England: Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 GEo. 5, c. 23 § 139.4OFrance: Arts. 27-28; Belgium Art. 11421 and various instances throughout the
statute. COPPER-ROYER SOCIETAeS k RESPONSABILITE "Limrrt EN Dkorr FRANgAis
(1931) 82.
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a reason for differentiating close corporations and partnerships. Where any
residual power, undisposed of by agreement, remains in the stockholders,
vote by shares is the natural intent of the incorporators.
E. The Recommended Remedy
Since the present board system, with its rigid theory that the board deter-
mines policy, ordinarily prevents legal and enforceable agreements assuring
(1) that authority may reside where the stockholders want to place it,
(2) that profits will be distributed as the parties desire, (3) that there will be
a solution in the event of impasse, and since such a result lacks realism with
respect to close corporations, it is suggested that the theory be supplanted.
The public is not affected by the internal agreements of the close corpora-
tion. The remedy recommended is: (1) eliminate the traps which threaten
relative ownership and voting power which have been stabilized by agree-
ment; (2) give each corporation the choice. of having or dispensing with
a board, and, in either case, permit the stockholders, by unanimous agree-
ment, to possess the powers normally resident in the board; and, (3) pro-
vide a summary form of specific enforcement of such agreements.
V. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
It is in the relationship of the stockholders to one another that corporate
concepts are least fitting. For one of 400,000 stockholders to owe personal
duties to another whom he has never met, simply because both own securi-
ties in one company, is, by today's standards, stretching a point. For three
stockholders, seeing one another daily, planning their business together hour-
ly, not to owe fiduciary obligations, is so incongruous, that it clearly appears
not to be the law. General statements that stockholders are trustees for one
another only when they misuse majority control, when they usurp the func-
tions of the board,41 or only in questions of management 42 do not apply
to close corporations.
A. The Interests of the Corporation
Since Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York and Northern Railway
Co.,43 it has been clear that if the majority stockholder of a corporation,
through control of it, exercises the corporate powers to the advantage of the
stockholder and to the detriment, of the corporation, that stockholder is ac-
41Blaustein v. Pan American P. & T. Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 119, 31 N. Y. S. (2d)
934, 956 (1st Dep't 1941) ; Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 216,
- N. Y. S. (2d) -, - (1st Dep't 1942).
42E. g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 622, 650 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
43150 N. Y. 410, 44 N. E. 1043 (1896). See also Gamble v. Queens County Water Co.,
123 N. Y. 91, 98, 25 N. E. 201, 202 (1890).
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countable to the corporation. Doubtless, a minority stockholder in position
so to use the corporation would be similarly liable.
In close corporations, with reference to the corporate property, we may
go beyond the element of control. The case of Meinhard v. Salnwn44 has
been cited by the Court of Appeals for the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship among the stockholders of a close corporation. It affords an excellent
example of the difference between close and public corporations. Meinhard
and Salmon, as co-adventurers, owned a leasehold. Without any fraud,45
Salmon, the manager, during the term, procured in his own behalf an exten-
sion of the lease, together with a lease on adjoining property, to follow the
adventurers' lease period. The court held that "by virtue of his agency"
he was "charged ... with the duty of disclosure" ;46 the "more obviously"47
because he was the manager of the adventure.
Judge Cardozo doubtless chose his words carefully. Perhaps it was more
obvious that with Meinhard relying on Salmon, as manager, the latter should
have disclosed his purpose; but Judge Cardozo probably would have found
the less obvious true too, that Meinhard, sitting back while Salmon worked,
would have been charged with the duty to disclose a like purpose.
Had Meinhard and Salmon been stockholders in a close corporation, it
appears that the result would have been the same; that it would have been
the same though either was a director, and whichever was the director; that
it would have been t~e same though one or the other owned only one-third
of the stock; whereas were Salmon or Meinhard one of 400,000 stockholders,
not in control of the corporation or responsible for its management, neither
would have been under such a duty.
Yet, until such a case is decided, there must be some doubt as to whether
this is the law of close corporations; consequently, a statute clearly creating
fiduciary obligations as to the corporate property is desirable.
B. The Shares of the Stockholders
In dealing with one another's shares, too, there should be, and doubtless
is, a fiduciary duty.
In Sautter v. Fulmer4" the defendant owned or controlled 307, of the 600
shares of a newspaper publishing corporation, the seven plaintiffs owning the
rest. Third parties approached the defendant regarding purchase either of
his or all of the shares (disputed as to which). The defendant told the
plaintiffs that $300 a share had been offered for stock of the corporation.
44249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928).451d. at 467, 164 N. E. at 548.
461d. at 465, 164 N. E. at 547.
471d. at 466, 164 N. E. at 547.
48258 N. Y. 107, 179 N. E. 310 (1932).
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When the defendant was asked whether this was what he was getting, he
"skillfully avoided" the issue. 49 The court found, however, that the plaintiffs
were justified in inferring that he too was getting $300. In fact, he re-
ceived $1098 a share. The plaintiffs sought, in an accounting action, 293/600
of the total purchase price paid, and received it. The conclusions of law
below, not disturbed above, were that the defendant "owning the controlling
stock in said corporation, occupied a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff and
to the other minority stockholders"; "that by reason of such relationship"
the defendant was under a duty to make full disclosure, which meant the
exact terms of the offer, which duty the defendant did not fulfill. Counsel
for the defendant (former Chief Judge Hiscock) argued that no such rela-
tionship exists between stockholders of a corporation. The plaintiff relied
primarily on Falk v. Hoffzan= 0 and Meinhard v. Salmon.51 The court cited
these cases as authofity for the judgment "against one occupying a fiduciary
position." No reference being made anywhere to an agency by defendant
in the sale, the only fiduciary relation traceable is that in the conclusions of law.
In Falk v. Hoffman, up on demurrer, the complaint alleged fraud,,and was
held to state a cause of action against a trustee for his wrong. Meinhard v.
Salmon rested too on a relationship of trust.
It is difficult, therefore, to resist the conclusion that the Sautter case estab-
lishes that one stockholder in a close corporation may not bargain with the
freedom of the market-place with respect to the stock-interests of his co-
stockholder.
C. Destruction of Stock Interests
Recognition of the fiduciary character of the relationship of stockholders
in a close corporation has been given where two try to "freeze out" the third.
The problem presented by "freeze-outs" is appropriately discussed below with
reference to dissolution, but mention of judicial approval of the fiduciary
principle should b made here.
In Kavanaugh v. Kavanmugh K-ittting Co., 2 two of the three stockholders
with equal interests attempted a statutory dissolution without judicial pro-
ceedings in order to eliminate the third and to carry on the business in another
entity for their own benefit. The three were sole directors. The statute then
required that a majority of the board deem dissolution advisable, and if
they so resolved, two-thirds of the stockholders might effect it.53 The two,
49This is the wording of the findings of the court.
50233 N. Y. 199, 135 N. E. 243 (1922).51See note 44 supra.
52226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148 (1919).
53Then, under N. Y. General Corporation Law §§ 170, 171 as now under §§ 101, 102,
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as directors, so resolved and, as stockholders, so voted. The Court of Appeals
restrained dissolution.
Three reasons were stated: (1) the two, in voting as directors, were
fiduciaries; (2) stockholders, when vested with the power to determine cor-
porate action, are fiduciaries; (3) directors, voting as stockholders, are still
fiduciaries. Since the vote resulted in unfairness, fiduciary obligations were
broken.
The first reason can hardly be controverted, but, evidently, the court felt
it insufficient to sustain the decision, in view of the stockholder vote. The
third reason, if sound, would rarely have practical significance except in a
close corporation. There, it raises the same question: Would "Meinhard," not
a director, be free, as a stockholder, to vote for his personal interests, while
director "Salmon," as a stockholder, would not? The second reason, if gen-
eral corporate law, would certainly undermine the gnerality that stock-
holders are fiduciaries to one another only when usurping the functions of the
board.54 It should be noted that the majority was not a single interest, but
was made up of minority interests, so that the second reason is an assertion
that minority stockholders, in voting, are fiduciaries. Of course, if the second
reason is law, the third reason is redundant.
The very statement of the second reason indicates that the first reason is
insufficient and that the court was not content to rely on the third reason and
thus allow the stockholder who pulls the strings for puppet directors to escape.
The case seems clearly peculiar to close corporations, holding "freeze-
outs" forbidden because of the fiduciary character of the members of close
corporations.5 5 While dissolution is the chief case where, for workability, an
exception should be made to the enforcement of fiduciary obligations,"6 the
recognition of the principle in the Kavanaugh case is no less significant.
D. The Books
Strangely enough, despite the Sautter and Kavanaugh decisions, and con-
trary to all principles of good faith, a stockholder who wishes to inspect the
corporation's books or demand a report of the president finds the authorities
difficult.
The general rule for all corporations is that a stockholder has a legal right
a majority of the stockholders could compel institution of proceedings for a judicial
dissolution but, as will be pointed out, it had been held that in such cases the court inst con-
sider the interest of the minorities, or that the court must be satisfied that dissolution
is to the advantage of stockholders as such and not of the majority as individuals.
54Cf. cases cited in notes 41-43 supra.
55 The statute no longer requires the directors to resolve that dissolution is advisable.
N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 105.5 6 See part VIII infra.
[Vol. 28
CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
to examine the corporate books, but, unfortunately, its application is left to
judicial discretion. 57  Statutory requirements of access to the stock-book s
and to the balance-sheet on application of holders of three per cent of the
stock59 are of no practical importance in a close corporation, and the judicial
discretion beyond that has been exercised so as to require the stockholder
to establish that his motives are not "ulterior." The problem arises repeatedly
where one stockholder is incapacitated and, during his absence, wants to
know what is happening or where one stockholder dies and his heirs want
to know.
While a recent decision of the Court of Appeals,6° to the effect that a desire
to determine whether there has been mismanagement is a proper motive, may
cause the pendulum to swing to greater liberality, it has been heretofore said
that the petitioner must show he needs the inspection to protect his interests, 61
that the motive of ousting the management-apparently though justified-is
"ulterior, ' 62 that a stockholder individually engaged in a similar business
must, because of possible misuse of the information, be denied access to
the books of the corporation in which he owns twenty-five per cent of the
stock.6 38
Under such rulings, petitioners owning, for example, fifty per cent, forty-
three per cent, thirty-three and one-third per cent, and twenty-five per cent
of the stock have been required to justify their motives.64 Strangely, too,
similar restrictions are found in French65 and Belgian60 laws, though authori-
tatively condemned. 67
The French and Belgian laws may be defended, however, in that there is
no limit to the number of stockholders in the former's S. A. R. L., and the
limit is fifty in the corresponding Belgian corporation. In our large corpora-
tions, the application of judicial discretion may be necessary to let the book-
U'Matter of Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 53 N. E. 1103 (1899).58N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 10.
591d. at § 77.
GODurr v. Paragon Trading Corp., 270 N. Y. 464, 1 N. E. (2d) 967 (1936).01Matter of Latimer v. Herzog Teleseme Co., 75 App. Div. 522, 78 N. Y. Supp. 314
(1st Dep't 1902). That the purpose of the inspection must be "reasonable" is also the
view adopted in the Uniform Business Corporation Law § 35.62Matter of Rehe, 136 Misc. 136, 239 N. Y. Supp. 41 (Sup. Ct. 1930).63Matter of Kennedy, 75 App. Div. 188, 77 N. Y. Supp. 714 (3d Dep't 1902).
6 4Matter of Hastings, 128 App. Div. 516, 112 N. Y. Supp. 800 (1st Dep't 1908), aff'd;
194 N. Y. 546, 87 N. E. 1120 (1909) (fifty per cent) ; People ex tel Ludwig v. Ludwig
& Co., 126 App. Div. 696, 111 N. Y. Supp. 94 (1st Dep't 1908) (forty-three per cent) ;
People ex tel Poleti v. Poleti et al., 193 App. Div. 738, 184 N. Y. Supp. 368 (1st Dep't
1920) (thirty-three and one-third per cent); Matter of Kennedy, 75 App. Div. 188,
77 N. Y. Supp. 714 (3d Dep't 1902).65France: Art. 30.
GOBelgium: 1142
67CoPPER-ROYER, op. cit. supra note 40, at pp. 193-197.
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keepers get at their books. In the close corporation it is unwarranted. The
cases seem to draw no distinction. Statutory statement, therefore, appears
necessary.68
E. Majority Agreements and Voting Trusts
Apart from the statutory right of stockholders to bind themselves to joint
action through a voting trust,69 they may, by agreement, bind themselves in
the selection of the board.70 A majority, in league, may thus eliminate the
minority voice completely. The difference between such an agreement and
one as to office, dividends, etc., is, as far as the minority is concerned, frequent-
ly tweedledum and tweedledee,7 for the agreement generally results in a divi-
sion of the spoils. The technical distinction, however, is pressed to the point
where a third party may not enforce an agreement as to office made by the
single, majority, dominating stockholder.72
A very recent case, falling between Clark v. Dodge and the majority agree-
ment cases, is Rochester v. Bergen, et al.73 Two months after the decision
in Clark v. Dodge, a stockholders' agreement was drawn, apparently by
a layman, in which the two unequal, common stockholders, the presi-
dent and treasurer of the corporation, agreed to "bind themselves to a
reciprocal contract of employment" for ten years "so far as it is not in con-
trast with the interests and rights of the other preferred stockholders."
Thereafter, the treasurer was removed from office and sought specific per-
formance of his agreement and the payment of his salary, the salaries being
payable to the parties in their capacities as officers. Neither party requested
a finding that plaintiff was unfaithful, inefficient, or incompetent or that
the agreement was "in contrast" with the interests of the preferred stock-
holders or of creditors. The lower court, assuming that the agreement for "re-
ciprocal" employment was one to keep in office, found it unenforceable, and
68For the affirmative duty of disclosure as between partners, see Butler v. Prentiss,
158 N. Y. 49, 52 N. E. 652 (1899) ; Kelly v. Delaney, 136 App. Div. 604, 121 N. Y. Supp.
241 (1st Dep't 1910), aff'd, 205 N. Y. 618. 98 N. E. 1105 (1912) : Wright v. Duke, 91
Hun 409, 36 N. Y. Supp. 853 (1st Dep't 1895); Guggenheim v. Guggenheim, 95 Misc.
332, 159 N. Y. Supp. 333 (Sup. Ct. 1916).69N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW q 50.
7OMcQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. Y. 234 (1934); Manson v. Curtis,
223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918). Strictly, these cases are not holdings on the point,
but they leave no doubt on the rule. These agreements apparently may be made without
time limit as contrasted with voting trusts.
71See Lehman, J., concurring in McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 333, 189 N. E.
234. 248 (1934).
72Fabre v. O'Donohue, 185 App. Div. 779, 173 N. Y. Supp. 472 (2d Dep't 1918). In
Beer v. Chandler, 289 N. Y. -, 43 N. E. (2d) 529 (1942), plaintiff recovered nothing
for the loss of office contracted for, but it seems counsel did not raise this issue, their
theory being that fraud induced him to take the office.73Law Report News, March 5, 1943, 9 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1943).
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then also found that the preferred stockholders had not consented, but held the
defendants (the corporation, the other directors, and the other common stock-
holder) were estopped to show this non-consent; therefore, he enforced the
agreement. The Appellate Division, holding the agreement unenforceable pre-
ferred to "construe" the word "employment" as not referring to office and
therefore found for the defendant. Since preferred stockholders are also
stockholders, this was in fact a majority agreement and consequently differs
from Clark v. Dodge.7 4
Thus, all the stockholders may not bind themselves, except where the case
falls within the not-yet-too-clear formula of Clark v. Dodge, to salary agree-
ments, but fewer than all may combine to pack the board and take all the
emoluments it controls.
If the relation is fiduciary, for two or more stockholders to combine in
advance to vote as a bloc, regardless of the merits of a future issue and
of their opinions when it arises, is, in no sense, a fulfillment of the obliga-
tion of fair dealing with the other stockholders. Such agreements are better
eliminated.
F. The Rule and Exceptions
The rules of the Sautter and Kavanaugh cases, applying special principles
to close corporations, should be the general rule and not the exceptions, be-
cause they fit the facts of the close, trusting relationship. Whatever the point
at issue, the fiduciary principle should be the starting point and exceptions
should be engrafted by statute. Where the party seeking to enforce the
rule is unfair, there is no exception, for equitable duties do not go so far.
VI. RELATIONS OF THE CORPORATION TO TiiRD PARTIES
For the sake of organization, the logically prior question of ultra vires
will be discussed later. Assuming acts intra vires, it is evident that there are
substantial factual distinctions between public and close corporations as to
(1) when any officer may bind the corporation and (2) which officer may
bind it in which respect.
A careful reading of the cases discloses that in this respect the courts have
penetrated form and have given due regard to the co-ownership, co-director-
ship, co-management of the stockholders in close corporations, regardless of
their titles. The welter of verbiage, however, which frequently makes no such
distinction, leaves occasional necessity to litigate these questions, occasional
74An agreement by the parties for "identical" remuneration was also not enforced,
whether on the theory that it fell with the agreement as to office or on the theory
that the parties had originally intended only that plaintiff's compensation should not exceed
that of those defendant's not appearing.
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uncertainty as to when technicality will be raised successfully, and ever a
vestige of doubt as to when a contract will be binding on the corporation.
A. The Cases
The opinions distinguish between general and other officers. "The president
or other general officer has power, prima facie, to do any act which the direc-
tors could authorize or ratify."75 The secretary appears to be a general officer
on equal footing with the president.t 6 "Prima facide" doubtless means that the
corporation may show that actual authority is wanting.77 Thereupon, the
plaintiff must establish apparent authority, within the ordinary rules of agen-
cy or partnership.78 The general officers have apparent authority "to act
in accordance with the general usage and practice of such corporations and
of the business in which the particular corporation is engaged, and their acts
within the scope of an authority to be presumed from such conditions will
bind the corporation in favor of persons possessing no knowledge of a lesser
authority, or who are not in possession of facts sufficient to, put a prudent
man on inquiry. '79
With one notable exception, however, it may be said that contracts intra
vires of the close corporation have been upheld when made by any officer.80
A contract, made by the secretary, assigning the rents of the corporation's
property, has been held valid, 8' although this would be questionable, to say
the least, in a public corporation. Promissory notes, made on the authority
of the treasurer alone, where he was general factotum, have been enforced.8 2
In each of these cases, the distinction between the close and public corpora-
tions was expressly noted. One exception was Berwin v. Hewitt Realty
Co.,83 where the president and treasurer of a close corporation were held
7 5 Hastings v. B. L. Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 473, 479, 34 N. E. 289, 291 (1893). This was
quoted as law in Harding v. Morgan Lithograph Co., 247 N. Y. 332, 338, 160 N. E. 388,
390 (1928), and Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., Inc., 263 N. Y. 6, 9,'188 N. E. 138,
139 (1933).
76Hastings v. B. L. Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 473, 34 N. E. 289 (1893) ; Barkin Construction
Co. v. Goodman, 221 N. Y. 156, 116 N. E. 770 (1917); Traitel Marble Co. v. Brown
Brothers, Inc., 159 App. Div. 485, 144 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1st Dep't 1913); Nathan v.
Regent Laundry Service, Inc., 153 Misc. 543, 274 N. Y. Supp. 509 (N. Y. C. Ct. 1933).
7'7Hardin v. Morgan Lithograph Co., 247 N. Y. 332, 339, 160 N. E. 388, 391 (1928).
7t8This is the clear purport of the cases cited in notes 75 and 76 supra, and is recognized
in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wen, Kroy R. Co. v. Public Nat. B. & T.
Co., 260 N. Y. 84, 183 N. E. 73 (1932).
79Traitel Marble Co. v. Brown Brothers, Inc., 159 App. Div. 485, 486, 144 N. Y. Supp.
562.563 (1st Dep't 1933).8OHall v. Herter Bros., 83 Hun 19, 31 N. Y. Supp. 692 (lst Dep't 1894), on retrial,
90 Hun 280, 35 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1st Dep't 1895), aff'd, 157 N. Y. 694, 51 N. E. 1091
(1898) ; Nathan v. Regent Laundry Service, Inc., 153 Misc. 543, 274 N. Y. Supp. 509
(N. Y. C. Ct. 1933).
81Barkin Construction Co. v. Goodman, 221 N. Y. 156, 116 N. E. 770 (1917).82Haff v. L. I. Fuel Corp.. 233 App. Div. 117, 251 N. Y. Supp. 67 (2d Dep't 1931).
83199 App. Div. 453, 191 N. Y. Supp. 817 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 608, 139
N. E. 754 (1923) (Cardozo and Crane, JJ. dissenting).
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unauthorized to engage the corporation to pay brokerage commissions be-
cause they were unauthorized to sell the land. This case, unjust on its face,
has apparently been overruled.8 4
B. The Suggestion
Certain acts of an officer, like certain acts of a partner, should not bind
the firm. Acts such as disposing of the factory of a manufacturing firm obvi-
ously put third parties on notice of a lack of power. These acts should be
enumerated in the statute, as in the Partnership Law. The partnership rule,
however, which gives each partner equal power to bind the firm, in the un-
excepted cases, would, at times, prove unsatisfactory in close corporations.
Often, employees are given shares of stock; sometimes, they buy minor in-
terests in the firm; frequently, shares are inherited by one or more who
know nothing of the business; occasionally, shares are held in unsubstantial
amounts for a variety of reasons.
When stockholders are of sufficient consequence to be officers, no justifica-
tion appears for complicated distinctions among them.85 Few laymen realize
that a secretary is a general officer, while a treasurer and vice-president are
not; most laymen regard the secretary as the least important of the three.
For the sake of clarification, therefore, rather than for the change it might
make in existing law, it is suggested: (1) that no officer shall have authority
to bind the corporation unless the act is "apparently for carrying on in the
usual way the business of the corporation" ;86 (2) that where the contract is
of a type that such corporations normally enter, any officer of the corporation
shall have the power to bind it, unless the third party knows of a lack of
authorization to the officer, as in the case of partner, girant, and Gesell-
schaftsfiihrer.8 7
The tort liability of a corporation, limited to its assets, is consonant with
present understanding and prevailing notions of fairness. Whether and when
insurance should be required is not strictly within this subject.
VIi. ACQUISITION OF STOCK BY THIRD PARTIES
Their close relationship makes it imperative that stockholders be able to
84St. John v. Fulton Market Realty Corp., 248 N. Y. 636, 162 N. E. 555 (1928).
85For a collection of cases, see 2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed.
(1931) § 581 (president; § 627 et seq. (vice-president) ; § 636 et seq. (secretary) ; § 654
et sea. (treasurer).86Heaman v. Rowell Co., 261 N. Y. 229, 185 N. E. 83 (1933); Noyes v. Irving Trust
Co., 250 App. Div. 274, 294 N. Y. Supp. 2 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 275 N. Y. 520, 11
N. E. (2d) 323 (1937). See Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., Inc., 263 N. Y. 6, 188
N. E. 138 (1933) : Chard v. Ryan Construction Co., 182 App. Div. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp.
622 (1st Dep't 1918).8TCf. Belgium: Art. 11416; Germany: § 37.
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control the identity of their fellows. In England88 and Belgium,8 9 in order
to come within the definition of the private company and Socit de Personnes
t ResponsabilitM Limit~e, the corporation must have restrictions upon trans-
fer of its shares. With us, in a close corporation, it is the rare stockholders'
agreement which provides no such restriction. Here is a problem obviously
unrelated to public corporations.
While preserving the right of each stockholder to withdraw at any time,
as when persons disagreeable to the stockholder acquire shares, it is also
desirable that the remaining stockholders be not compelled to liquidate in
order to achieve that end. Ordinarily, therefore, the stockholders' agree-
ments include options to the remaining stockholders to buy at the price
offered by the third party or at book value, and provisions for redeeming
stock from attaching creditors. To avoid complicated provisions and to pre-
serve such rights when stockholders' agreements are deficient, a uniform
general method is desirable.
Under the Partnership Law, automatic dissolution no longer follows upon
transfer of one partner's interest voluntarily'or by a charging order, 90 but,
with the' exception of a partnership which has been given a long life by the
agreement creating it, the effect is that the third party, as well as the partners,
may end the partnership at will.91
With respect to transfer, French and Belgian laws offer suggestions. In
France, shares in the S.A.R.L. are non-negotiable, but upon the consent
of a majority of the stockholders, owning three-quarters of the shares, an
outside purchaser may enter the firm.92 This probably suffices to prevent most
unwanted transfers. The Belgians place the same restrictions upor inter vivos
transfers, except that such transfers may be made to certain close relatives
with the same freedom as to other stockholders. 93 The most appealing pro-
visions of the Belgian law are that, absenta stockholders' agreement to the
. contrary, if consent to the sale is refused by co-stockholders, the would-be
seller may, if the refusal is 'arbitrary, compel the co-stockholders either to
buy his shares at a price fixed by the court or liquidate the corporation.9"
The Belgian method should be modified to allow the sale to be made, and
to put the burden on co-stockholders to buy the shares at an agreed price,
or a court-fixed price, or to liquidate. The same result is achieved thereby
88See note 5 supra.89 See note 6 supra.
90N. Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 53, 54, 63.911d. at §§ 62, 63.92France: Arts. 21-2293Belgium: Art. 11412.941d. at Art. 11413.
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without delay to the selling stockholder; that delay could be used to oppress
him.
There is no reason why those who choose should not still write their own
"first refusal" and option contracts if they prefer. Such a statutory method,
however, assures that a close corporation may remain close and that the
retiring stockholder may sell his shares at a fair price.
VIII. DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION
Under existing law, probably nothing causes more unfairness in the con-
duct of close corporations than an inability to compel liquidation.
Where a minority stockholder is at loggerheads with the majority; where
he is incapacitated; and probably most often when he dies and his widow
becomes the stockholder, there follows a pattern so frequent that few lawyers
have not observed it.
The widow, being one-half or one-third owner, thinks she is entitled at
least to her husband's dividends, if not his salary. The survivors, carrying
an extra burden, feel they should have larger salaries and often special
emoluments. Expense accounts swell, salaries grow, net profits decline, divi-
dends usually disappear. The widow sells out cheaply,"5 or holds her stock
without return, 90 or she fights, in which case dissolution is attempted, with
the active stockholders taking the business along to a new corporation. 97
As a practical matter, the widow is faced with this: (1) if she owns less
than a majority, she cannot force dissolution, for 'inder General Corpora-
tion Law Section 102, a majority is needed, and under" Stock Corporation
Law Section 105, two-thirds; (2) unless salaries are exorbitantly raised, she
will find difficulty convincing the court that raises are unjustified; (3) to
fight the suit to remove minor padding of the accounts, which will be dis-
puted, will not be worth the candle; (4) to sell out, she must take an in-
adequate price. The survivors may dissolve without judicial proceedings if
they own two-thirds of the stock.98 If they have a majority or control of
the board, they may attempt judicial dissolution,99 in which event they will
be challenged to establish that dissolution is to the interest of all the stock-
holders, including the minority, as stockholders, and not as individuals,
which view has the sanction of the cases. 910 A suit by the widow on the same
95Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't 1908),
aff'd. 196 N .Y. 510. 89 N. E. 1114 (1909).9 6Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co.. 226 N. Y. 185. 123 N. E. 148 (1919).9 7Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914).
08N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 105.
99 N. Y. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 101. 102.
'
0
oHitch v. Hawley, 132 N. Y. 212, 30 N. E. 401 (1892) ; Matter of Rateau Sales Co.,
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ground may prevent a voluntary dissolution even though the survivors own
two-thirds of the stock, under the Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co. doc-
trine.10 1 While the statute has been changed so that two-thirds of the stock-
holders entitled to vote may choose dissolution without any resolution by the
directors that they deem it advisable, the second and third reasons102 in the
Kavanaugh case still apply and in close corporations either reason standing
alone would suffice to defeat dissolution.
The European laws have made no better disposition of this problem. In
France, unless so" stipulated, death 'of one associate does not effect dissolu-
tion0 3 and no special provision is made for dissolution of the S.A.R.L., as
distinguished from the SocitY Anonyme, the public corporation. In Ger-
many, three-quarters vote or "important grounds" are requisite to compel
dissolution.' 4 The English require three-quarters, or proof that it is "just
and equitable" that there be a dissolution. 0 5 The Belgians, except for the
provision next discussed, mention only serious depletion of capital 0 6 as
cause for dissolution, this being a ground also in the other countries.
The Belgians meet the problem which arises most frequently, the succes-
sion by the widow or children to stock ownership. Shares are made freely
alienable or descendible to husband or wife and to direct lineal ascendants
and descendants. 0 7 If the other stockholders reftise to accept these alienees
or inheritors as voters, the stock ceases to carry voice. In that case, the
unacceptable ones may, as in the case of the stockholder who wants to sell
his shares, have the court fix a fair price, and if the others will not pay it,
they may compel dissolution' 08
In many cases this gives a satisfactory result, but where the widow and
children are accepted fully and are then voted down effectively, it is no
solution.
In this type of case, there is today rarely an honorable and agreeable
solution. If either the widow or the survivor, however, may compel dissolu-
tion, all the assets, including good will, 0 9 may be sold, the widow has her
just share, and the survivors may support themselves freely in a new busi-
ness, freed of her. The fiduciary obligations recognized in the Kavanaugh
201 N. Y. 420, 94 N. Y. 869 (1911); Matter of American Tel. & Cable Co., 139 Misc.
625, 248 N. Y. Supp. 98 (1931).
'
0lKavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148 (1919).
'
02See part V, section C, supra.
'
0 3France: Art. 36.
20 4Germany: §§ 60, 61.
'
0 5England: Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 GEo. 8, c. 23 § 168.06Belgium: Art. 11426.
'
0 7Id. at Art. 11412.
'
081d. at Art. 11414.
'
09Cf. Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914).
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case are sound, but the need for freedom of dissolution overrides those
duties in this instance. Such is the rule in partnership, except that the major-
ity there may take along the partnership name.110
Dissolution, of course, may be used as an instrument of injustice."' A
minority stockholder who has risked his capital and devoted his energy to
building a business, may, if excluded by dissolution, be unable to compete
with the majority, who start anew. But, in close corporations, lack of har-
mony may well be a greater obstacle to success, and, in addition, the greater
frequency of injustice resulting from inability to dissolve justifies the ex-
ception.
Accordingly, it is suggested that freedom of dissolution, as in partnerships,
be conferred. The corporation or the majority stockholders, may by paying a
fair price, continue, just as partners who so desire may remain together. The
party who is squeezed may retire at a fair price. If, unfortunately, the money to
buy out is not available, it is itill better to liquidate, give a share of the assets
to each, and avoid disagreeable continuance with no return to the weak.
If provision is made in accordance with these suggestions, the question
arises whether, as against co-contractors, the dissolution is voluntary. As in
partnership," 2 no contract of the parties or with third parties should preirent
dissolution. But voluntary dissolution justifies' liability for termination of
performance."18 The dissolution forced by one of the stockholders should be
treated as voluntary, creating liability to the other party to the contract.
IX. MANNER OF INCORPORATION AND POWERS
Certain considerations as to form are also relevant.
First, there is no reason why one man or a corporation should not form
a close corporation. The hocus-pocus of three subscribers, three directors and
officers for a one-man corporation should be forgotten; let the one man
form his corporation and be its officer. A corporation, after the drivel of
having some dummies incorporating a subsidiary, which it cannot itself do,"14
may acquire all the stock.115 This circumlocution should be put in limbo.
Secondly, since organization of close corporations precedes filing the cer-
iON. Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 80(2).
"'lCf. Hornstein, Voluntary Dissolution-A New Development in Intracorporate Abuse
(1941) 51 YALE L. J. 64.
1 2 N. Y. PARTNERSHaIP LAW § 62(2). Cahill v. Haff, 248 N. Y. 377, 162 N. E. 288(1928) ; 3urnstine v. Geist, 257 App. Div. 792, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 48 (lst Dep't 1939).
"
3 People v. Globe Mutual L. I. Co., 91 N. Y. 174 (1883) ; Mason v. Standard Distill-
ing, etc., Co., 85 App. Div. 520, 87 N. Y. Supp. 343 (1st Dep't 1903).
"
4 N. Y. STocK CORPORATION LAW § 5. Schwab v. Potter & Co., 194 N. Y. 409, 83
N. E. 670 (1909).
115N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 18.
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tificate, the certicate may well contain information for the benefit of those
who read it,, be signed by the true stockholders, and list the names of
its actual officers and directors. For all practical purposes, the corpora-
tion exists when its certificate is mailed.'1 6 This bit of realism might make the
certificate of some assistance.
Thirdly, it may well be questioned, whether apart from measuring the tax
on the corporation, a clause setting forth the classification of shares and
the authorized capital is of any value. The actual capital, as in limited part-
nerships, if any capital is to be stated, would serve a better end.
Fourthly, the tedious labor and the reams of paper that go into "purposes"
stated in the certificate of incorporation should be saved. If a corporation
exceeds its powers today, it is generally through illegality or because of very
poor draftsmanship, because acts ultra vires must exceed not only express
powers, but all the "incidental" ones which are generously implied ;117 the
certificate, of course, is freely amendable. If creditors are theoretically in-
jured by the corporation's exceeding its powers, it is only because the drafts-
man forgot the extra words that would have made the act intra vires. If
stockholders are to be protected, a more effective method is to direct their
attention to drawing limitations on general powers rather than to passing
on an exhausting list of purposes. The certificate should confer the power to
do all things that an individual or partnership might do,;" 8 subject only to ex-
pressed restrictions.
Whether the best way to accomplish this technically is by an elaborate
section or by a simple removal of the necessity to state powers, or by an
in-between method, need not be discussed here. Precedents exist in other
states."19
Such blanket authority would eliminate restraints imposed by corporate
theory, such as that a corporation may not enter a partnership, 20 even though
1160f course, it may be returned if the purchaser proposes an illegal business, Matter
of Stewart v. Dep't of State, 174 Misc. 902, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 164 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd,
260 App. Div. 979, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 226 (3d Dep't 1940), but intent is not normally
revealed in the certificate. Mechanical errors, too, occur but they may be quickly
remedied.
117CJ. 7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) 561. See Curtis v.
Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 64 (1857) ; Holmes v. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75, 25 N. E. 1083 (1890)
Koehler v. Reinheimer, 26 App. Div. 1, 49 N. Y. Supp. 755 (1st Dep't 1898).
1181n Hohi v. Claus Lipsius Brewing Co. 21 App. Div. 204, 207, 47 N. Y. Supp.
518, 520 (2d Dep't 1897), Goodrich, P.J., said "The doctrine of ultra vires originated
at a time when nearly all corporations were created for public purposes; and there is no
reason why it should ever have applied to private corporations any more than to the
powers of individuals in a partnership."
119See Stevens, Ultra Vires Transactions under the New Ohio General Corporation
Act (1930) 4 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 419 and the references and statutes quoted there.
120People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834 (1890).
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the certificate of incorporation expressly includes that power.12 1 It would
eliminate the law that certain powers exist only if embodied in the certificate,
such as the right to purchase stock in another corporation.1 2 2 Entering a part-
nership, for example, has saved many corporations without threatening any
readily foreseeable harm.1 23
X. PROVISIONS OF OTHER LAWS
Many requirements of the General and Stock Corporation Laws should be
fully applicable to a close corporation. Such sections as 15, 58, and 59 of
the Stock Corporation Law should be incorporated by reference, as should
Section 35 with modifications. Other sections, such as 85 et seq., seem both
unnecessary and undesirable.
Taxation, with us, has always been a matter apart from corporation laws.
Factors other than legal theory and business practice enter. Whether close
corporations should, for tax purposes, be treated as a partnership or as a
corporation will not be considered.
CONCLUSION
Because of thfe broad scope covered here, it has been impossible to give
adequate examples of each of the situations, so familiar to practitioners, which
need remedying. In many respects, the law of today is unsuitable; in others,
there is grave doubt as to what the law is. Some modification and clarifica-
tion are needed; the annexed draft of a statute is the writer's conception of
'the type desired. Where suitable the wording of the Stock Corporation and
Partnership Laws has been used. Section 21 has been copied, in part, from
the Ohio General Corporation Act. The other sections are original.
APPENDIX
THE CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
ARTIcLE 1
Short Title; Application
Section 1. Short Title. This chapter shall be known as the Close Corporation
Law.
Section 2. Application. This chapter shall apply ,to any stock corporation in which
121In (1935) Opinions of the Attonwy-General 230, the conclusion was reached that
a provision in the certificate permitting the corporation to enter a partnership, should
be stricken; and that the inclusion of a corporation as a "person" in the N. Y. Part-
nership Law § 2 was an oversight. In other states, it has been held that including such
power in the certification empowered the corporation to enter a partnership. See
3 CooK, LAW OF CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 678.
122N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 18.
123 See Schneider v. Greater M. & S. Circuit, Inc., 144 Misc. 534, 259 N. Y. Supp. 319
(Sup. Ct. 1932).
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the stock is owned by not more than five persons who elect to incorporate under
this law. The representatives of a decedent's estate shall for one year after his
decease be deemed one person within the meaning hereof. Otherwise, whether the
stockholder is a corporation, partnership, trustee, executor, administrator, nominee
or any other representative, the number of persons beneficially interested as stock-
holders, partners, beneficiaries, legatees, principals, etc., shall be deemed the number
of stockholders.
Section 3. Supervening Disqualification. Whenever the ownership of the stock
ceases to be held by as few as five persons, upon petition of the Attorney-General
or of any stockholder, the Supreme Court shall order a vote of the stockholders.
within a reasonable time to elect: (1) to qualify under the Stock Corporation
Law, in which event any stockholder shall have the right to the relief provided
under Section 70 hereof, or, (2) to dissolve and liquidate, or, (3) to requalify if
by voluntary purchase and sale of shares by one stockholder to another, the num-
ber of stockholders is reduced to five or fewer.
Section 4. Supervening Qualification. Any corporation now or hereafter organ-
ized which is or becomes qualified for incorporation hereunder may by unanimous
vote of its voting stock elect to become a "close" corporation by filing a certificate
under Section 20 hereof. With respect to any action taken prior thereto, the law
theretofore governing shall continue to do so.
Section 5. Limitations. Nothing herein contained shall abridge the right of any
"close" corporation or any corporation which would be able to qualify as a "close"
corporation to qualify under the Stock Corporation Law rather than hereunder.
No close corporation shall engage in any business forbidden under the Stock Cor-
poration Law.
ARTIcLE 2
Organizing a Close Corporation
Section 10. Organization Meeting. Any qualified person may organize a close
corporation by subscribing and filing a certificate of incorporation in accordance
wth Section 20 hereof. When a close corporation is to be formed by more than one
person, they shall meet and elect one or mord officers or directors, who shall serve
for one year after the incorporation. Thereafter, the actual owners of the initial
capital shall subscribe and file a certificate of incorporation in accordance with
Section 20 hereof. Upon the filing thereof, the corporation, its officers and direc-
tors shall be such in law.
ARTICLE 3
Formnation of Close Corporations
Section 20. Incorporation. Any person, any number of persons, any corpora-
tion, or any aggregate of persons may form a close corporation for any lawful busi-
ness purpose or purposes permitted under the Stock Corporation Law by making,
subscribing, acknowledging, and filing a certificate which shall be entitled and en-
dorsed "Certificate of Incorporation of ................................ pursuant to
Article Three of the Close Corporation Law" (the blanl space being filled in with
the name of the corporation) and which shall state:
1. The name of the proposed corporation.
2. What business and other powers, if any, in addition to those prohibited by
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law or prohibited without compliance with certain conditions, the corporation shall
not be permitted to do or exercise.
3. The amount of cash and a description of and the agreed value of the other
property, forming the initial capital of the corporation.
4. Either the amount of the capital stock and the number and par value of
the shares of which it is to consist, or, if the corporation is to issue shares without
par value, the statements required by Section 12 of the Stock Corporation Law.
5. If the shares are to be classified, the number of shares to be included in each
class and all of the designations, preferences, privileges, and voting powers of the
shares of each class, and the restrictions or qualifications thereof.
If any class of stock which is preferred as to dividends or assets is to be issued
in series as provided by Section 11 of the Stock Corporation Law, either (a) the
designations, preferences, privileges, and voting powers of the shares of the first
series of such class, and the restrictions or qualifications thereof, and that the board
of directors is authorized to fix from time to time before issuance the designations,
preferences, privileges, and voting powers of the shares of each subsequent series of
such class, and the restrictions or qualifications thereof, or (b) that the board of
directors is authorized to fix from time to time before issuance the designations,
preferences, privileges, and voting powers of the shares of each series of such class,
and the restrictions or qualifications thereof.
6. The city, village, or town, and the county, within the state, in which the
office of the corporation is to be located, and the address, within or without the
state, to which the Secretary of State shall mail a copy of process in any action or
proceeding against the corporation which may be served upon him.
7. Its duration.
8. The names and addresses of (1) the legal and beneficial owners of its stock;
(2) its director or directors; (3) its officer or officers. There may be one or more
stockholders, directors, or officers.
9. That all the subscribers of the certificate are of full age, that at least two-
thirds of them are citizens of the United States, and that at least one of them is a
resident of the State of New York.
10. If meetings of the board of directors are to be held only within the state
the certificate must so provide.
11. The certificate shall be subscribed by all the stockholders.
The certificate may contain any additional agreements of the stockholders
which may govern their relations among themselves.
Section 21. Powers of a 'Close Corporation. Whenever a corporation shall be
formed under this law, it shall have the capacity and all the powers of an indi-
vidual with respect to all lawful business permittecl under the Stock Corporation
Law, except insofar as such powers are prohibited or limited in Paragraph 2 of
its certificate of incorporation and any certificate amendatory thereto.
No limitation on the exercise of the authority of .the corporation shall be asserted
in any action between the corporation and any person, except by. or on behalf of
the corporation against a director or an officer or a person having actual knowledge
of such limitation.
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ARTICLE 4
Stock, Stockholders, Officers, and Directors
Section 30. Stock. The interests of stockholders in a close corporation shall be
represented by shares of stock, which shall be non-assessable. Stock shall be issued
only for money, labor done, or property actually received for the use and lawful
purposes of such corporation. Every statement filed or issued for any purpose of
the corporation showing stock ownership or the financial condition of the corpora-
tion shall state the number and class of shares issued for property and the number
and class of shares issued for services. No stock shall be issued for services rendered
or property received unless the director or directors honestly believe the fraction of
the corporation's net worth represented by the shares issued is no greater than the
value of the labor done or property received. The issuance of a greater number of
shares for labor or property than so prescribed without such honest belief shall con-
stitute a fraud on stockholders opposing or not participating and the failure to
reflect such labor done or property received on the books or any statements of the
corporation shall constitute a fraud on all creditors becoming such subsequent to
the sale of stock.
Section 31, Preferred and Common Shares. A close corporation shall have power
to create and issue two or more classes of shares, with such designations, prefer-
ences, privileges, and voting powers or restrictions or qualifications thereof as the
certificate of incorporation, or other certificate creating such shares and filed pur-
suant to law, provides; but no shares which are entitled to preference in the dis-
tribution of dividends or assets shall be designated as common stock or shares.
Section 32. Shares Without Par Value. A close corporation may issue shares
without par value under the terms and conditions set forth in Section 12 of the
Stock Corporation Law.
Section 33. Form of Certificate. The form of the certificate of stock shall be that
prescribed in the Stock Corporation Law, except that it need be signed by only
one officer if there is only one, and by any two officers if there are more than one.
Section 34. Increase of Stock. Unless provided for in an agreement made by all
stockholders, there shall be no increase in the number of issued shares, whether
such increase is by way of increasing authorized capital or of increased issuance
withiin previously authorized capital; and unless provided to the contrary in an
agreement made by all stockholders, Section 39 of the Stock Corporation Law shall
apply to any new issuance of stock.
Whenever stock in the corporation is sold by one or more stockholders to one or
more other stockholders, their appointees or members of their families, each other
stockholder shall be entitled to purchase his pro rata share thereof at the price paid
therefore.
Section 35. Meetings of Stockholders. All powers not delegated by this chapter
or by agreement of all the stockholders, shall reside in the stockholders and shall be
exercised by them in meetings.' M\1eetings of stockholders may be summoned by
the president, the directors, or the owner or owners of ten per cent of the voting
stock of the corporation in the manner provided in the Stock Corporation Law.
In the absence of other agreement the provisions of the Stock Corporation Law
shall govern the conduct of such meetings and the 4oting powers of the stock-
holders. By agreement of all the stockholders, the voting rights of any stock-
holder or the owner of any specified shares of stock may be restricted or enlarged
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in any way and with respect to any matter, as specifically set forth in this article
or otherwise, any provision of this or any other corporation law of this state to
the contrary notwithstanding."
Section 36. Directors. If all the stockholders so agree;-the affairs of the corpora-
tion shall be managed by a director or a board of directors. In the absence of such
agreement or in the event the stockholders fail to name a director or directors, the
sole supervisors of corporate affairs shall be the stockholders. In the event there
is such an agreement, a director or directors named in the certificate of incorpora-
tion shall manage the affairs of the corporation until a new director or directors
are named. The certificate of incorporation or any other agreement made at any
time by and among all the stockholders may fix the number of directors, the
method of electing the director or board of directors, and the method of removal
of one or more of them. Such certificate or other agreement may grant to any
stockholder or stockholders or to the present or future holder or holders of any par-
ticular shares of stock the right to designate one or more diretors at some or all
future elections of directors. In the absence of provision in the certificate or in
such agreement as to how new directors are to be elected, the" provisions of the
Stock Corporation Law shall govern. Unless otherwise provided in such an agree-
ment or certificate, a director need not be a stockholder.
Section 37. Meetings of Directors. In addition to any other provision made by
the stockholders, directors, or corporation with respect to meetings of the board,
any director may call a meeting of the board upon the giving of reasonable notice
thereof (five days shall be deemed always reasonable) for the purpose of any action
or countermanding any action of the corporation. The certificate of incorporation
or any other agreement made at any time by and among all the stockholders may
provide that action of the board may be taken -only by unanimous vote or in any
other way.
Unless contrary to the provisions of the certificate or such agreement, the pro-
visions of the Stock Corporation Law shall govern the powers of directors and
the manner of exercising such powers.
Section 38. Action of the Corporation. The certificate of incorporation or any
other agreement among the stockholders may give to any particular stockholder
or holder or holders of certain shares' of stock, without regard to relative owner-
ship, the right to dictate or veto any specified action or type of action on the part
of the corporation, 'whether or not opp~osed by the other stockholders or the
directors.
Section 39. Decision by Third Party or Agent. The certificate of incorporation
or any agreement of the stockholders may provide that in the event of a deadlock
between stockholders or directors any issues as to action by the corporation shall
be left to the decision of a third party or third parties, who may but need not be
stockholders, officers, or directors of the corporation. Any specific action by the
corporation or the general management of the business of the corporation may by
agreement of all the stockholders be entrusted to an agent or agents who need not
be stockholders, officers, or directors of the corporation and the action of such
third parties or agents shall be binding upon all stockholders of the corporation
and the corporation in accordance with the terms)of the agreement, but no such
agreement shall affect the rights of third parties as set forth in Article 6 hereof.
Section 40. Officers. There shall be one or more executive officers of the cor-
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poration. Only those denominated president, vice-president, secretary, and treas-
urer, and no assistant to any such officer, nor any other, shall be an officer of a
close corporation. The officer or officers named in the certificate of incorporation
shall act as such until removed or replaced. The certificate of incorporation or
any other agreement made at any time by and among all the stockholders may:
(1) fix the number of officers, the method of selecting and removing them, their
duties, powers, privileges, and compensation, and (2) grant to any stockholder or
stockholders or the present or future holder or holders of any particular shares
of stock the right to designate one or more officers at some future time or at all
times. In the absence of such provision in the certificate or agreement, the stock-
holders, if there are no directors, and the director or board of directors, if there are
such, shall appoint and remove the officer or officers and shall fix their powers,
priVileges, and compensation. Unless forbidden in the certificate of incorporation
or by agreement of all stockholders, the stockholders or the director or the board of
directors, if there are such, may designate officers in addition to those specified
in such certificate or agreement with the same power as if there were no such
agreement, provided, however, that they shall not thereby infringe upon rights con-
ferred in any such agreement. No officer of the corporation need be a stockholder
or director.
Section 4L On Whom Agreements Binding. Any agreement sanctioned in this
article and embodied in the certificate of incorporation shall be binding upon all
existing and future stockholders. Any agreement referred to in this article and not
embodied in the certificate of incorporation shall bind all existing stockholders and
all who purchase certificates in which reference is made to the existence of such
an agreement.
Section 42. Agreements by Fewer Than All Stockholders. No agreement by
fewer than all the stockholders of a close corporation with respect to any of
the types of agreement mentioned in 'this article shall be binding on such stock-
holders, the corporation, or any other stockholder.
Section 43. Enforcement of Agreements. Any stockholder or stockholders or
the corporation may petition the Supreme Court for an order enforcing the terms
of any agreement valid under this article as provided in Section - of the Civil
Practice Act. Any party aggrieved by breach of such agreement may maintain an
action for damages against those parties thereto who refuse to carry out its terms,
or against the corporation for breach of any agreement other than one to elect the
plaintiff or' another a director and whenever an action lies against both the parties
and the corporation, he may sue either or both.
ARIcLE 5
Fiduciary Relationship among Stockholders
Section 50. Stockholders Accointable as Fiduciaries. Every stockholder must
account to the corporation for any benefit and hold as trustee for it any profits
derived by him without the consent of other stockholders from any transaction in
connection with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the corporation, or from
any use by him of its property, or from any transaction in which the opportunity
to participate should, in equity, be given to the corporation. Every stockholder
must account to the corporation for any damage he has caused the corporation
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by acting in excess of his authority, in breach of any agreement with stockholders
or the corporation, or in bad faith. Every stockholder must account to any other
stockholder to whom as stockholder he has caused damage through inequity, which
damage has not been suffered by the corporation.
Section 51. Corporate Books. The books of a close corporation shall include at
least a stock book, a minute book, and books of account. These and any and all
other corporate books shall be kept, subject to unanimous agreement of the stock-
holders to the contrary, at the principal place of business of the corporation. Every
stockholder shall have, in person or by any representative he chooses, at all times dur-
ing the corporate existence and after dissolution, access to and may inspect and copy
any and all of such books in whole or in part. If any officer or agent of any such cor-
poration shall wilfully neglect or refuse to exhibit any such book, or to allow any such
book t6 be inspected and extracts taken therefrom as provided in this section, the cor-
poration and such officer or agent shall each forfeit and pay to the party injured
a penalty of fifty dollars for every such neglect or refusal, and all damages result-
ing to him therefrom. The rights of the stockholder herein provided shall be en-
forceable by motion in any action pending in the Supreme Court or by special
proceeding in the Supreme Court.
Section 52. Rendering Account. The president of the corporation shall render
or cause to be rendered on demand true and full information of all things affect-
ing the corporation to any stockholder or the legal representative of any deceased
stockholder or of any stockholder under legal disability.
ARTIcLS 6
Rights of Third Parties
Section 60. Acts of an Officer. 1. Every officer is an agent of the corporation
for the purpose of its business and the act of every officer, including the execution
in the corporate name of any instrument, for carrying on in the usual way the
business of the corporation of which he is an officer, binds the corporation, unless
the officer so acting has in fact no authority to act for the corporation in the par-
ticular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact
that he has no such authority.
2. An act of an officer which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business
of the corporation in the usual way does not bind the corporation unless author-
ized by the stockholders or the board of directors, if any.
3. Unless authorized by the stockholders or the board of directors, if any, no
officer or officers shall have authority to:
(a) Assign the corporate property in trust for creditors or on the assignee's prom-
ise to pay the debts of the corporation.
(b) Dispose of the good will of the business.
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary
business of the corporation.
(d) Confess a judgment.
4. No act of an officer in contravention of a restriction on his authority shall
bind the corporation to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
Section 61. Conveyance or Mortgage of Real Property. The conveyance or mort-
gage of real property of the corporation shall be governed by Section 16 of the
Stock Corporation Law.
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Section 62. Acquisition of Stock by Third Parties. At any time after ownership
of any shares of the stock of the corporation passes to one other than an original
stockholder, whether by foreclosure of a pledge, by inheritance, by sale under
execution or other legal process, by voluntary sale or otherwise, but not later than
ninety days after the certificate or certificates are presented to the corporation for
transfer, the corporation or, upon its refusal, the owners of more than fifty per cent
of the remaining voting shares of the corporation, regardless of classification of stock,
may institute proceedings pursuant to Section 21 of the Stock Corporation Law,
and upon a determination under such law of the value of the stock, the corpora-
tion or the petitioning stockholders shall have the legal right within thirty days
of the.entry of such order, to purchase the said stock at such appraised value. The
person acquiring the stock shall have no rights by virtue of such acquisition until
the expiration of one or more such periods without action by the corporation or
the said stockholders.
Section 63. Tort Liability. The liability of stockholders, officers, directors, and
corporations in tort shall be the same as in the case of corporations organized under
the Stock Corporation Law.
ARTIcLE 7
Dissolution of a Close Corporation
Section 70. Right of a Stockholder to Compel Dissolution. Any stockholder shall
have the right, upon demand, to have the corporation dissolved and liquidated,
unless (1) the corporation or (2) the other stockholders or (3) the holders of a ma-
jority of the other voting shares, with right of precedence in that order, give notice
within fifteen days of receipt of his demand, that they will, in thirty days, deposit
in escrow a sum ten per cent in excess of the book value of his stock, pending an
appraisal of his shares, and agree that upon such appraisal they will pay him the
appraised value of his stock. Upon such demand being made, the corporation, the
purchasing stockholders, or the selling stockholders may pursue the procedure pro-
Vided in Section 21 of the Stock Corporation Law, or any procedure agreed upon
by all the stockholders to obtain such appraisal, and a transfer at the appraised
price shall be enforceable by order of the Supreme Court in a special proceeding
for that purpose.
Section 71. Method of Compelling Dissolution. In the event that neither the
corporation nor the stockholders specified in Section 70 shall give the notice or
make the deposit within the time therein provided, and if within that time a certi-
ficate shall not be filed pursuant to Section 105 of the Stock Corporation Law, the
demanding stockholder may institute a special proceeding in the Supreme Court for
a dissolution of the corporation and upon a showing of the facts required in this
and the preceding section, an order of dissolution and' liquidation shall be made, pro-
vided that the court may make such provision for additional time for the purchase
of the stock as may be just.
Section 72. Contracts for a Period Beyond Dissolution. The provisions of Sec-
tion 70 shall apply regardless of any contracts of the corporation for a period extend-
ing beyond the period fixed for dissolution. Any party to such a contract with the
corporation shall be entitled to his damages as if "for breach of contract, but shall
not be allowed to interfere with the dissolution.
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Section 73. Liquidation. Upon the dissolution of a close corporation for any
cause and whether voluntary or involuntary, the provisions of Section 29 of the
General Corporation Law shall apply, except that by agreement theretofore or there-
after made by all the stockholders, filed and recorded in the corporate books, any
person may be appointed as liquidating director, and the provisions of Section 29
of the General Corporation Law with respect to the board of directors shall apply
to such director, and except that upon the termination of such director's relationship
for any cause during said liquidation, any stockholder may call the meeting pro-
vided for in the said section.
Section 74. Additional Provisions. Unless inconsistent with the- terms of this
article, all provisions of the Stock Corporation Law and General Corporation Law
with respect to dissolution and liquidation shall be deemed additional hereto and
in nowise replaced hereby.
